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Abstract
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of max-
imin share allocations. Given a set of n players, the maximin share of a single player is the
best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition the items in any way she prefers,
into n bundles, and then receive her least desirable bundle. The objective then is to find an
allocation, so that each player is guaranteed her maximin share.
Previous works have studied this problemmostly algorithmically, providing constant fac-
tor approximation algorithms. In this work we embark on amechanism design approach and
investigate the existence of truthful mechanisms. We propose three models regarding the
information that the mechanism attempts to elicit from the players, based on the cardinal
and ordinal representation of preferences. We establish positive and negative (impossibility)
results for each model and highlight the limitations imposed by truthfulness on the approx-
imability of the problem. Finally, we pay particular attention to the case of two players, which
already leads to challenging questions.
1 Introduction
We study the design of mechanisms for a fair division problemwith indivisible items. The objec-
tive in fair division is to allocate a set of resources to a set of players in a way that leaves everyone
satisfied, according to their own preferences. Over the past decades, several fairness concepts
have been proposed and the area gradually gained popularity in computer science as well, since
most of the questions are inherently algorithmic. We refer the reader to the upcoming survey [20]
for more recent results and to the classic textbooks [8, 22] for an overview of the area.
Our focus here is on the concept of maximin share allocations, which has already attracted
a lot of attention ever since it was introduced by Budish [10]. The rationale for this notion is as
follows: suppose that a player, say player i , is asked to partition the items into n bundles and
then the rest of the players select a bundle before i . In the worst case, player i will be left with her
least valuable subset. Hence, a risk-averse player would choose a partition that maximizes the
∗A preliminary conference version appeared in IJCAI 2016.
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minimum value of a bundle. This value is called the maximin share of agent i and the goal then
is to find an allocation where every person receives at least her maximin share.
The existence of maximin share allocations is not always guaranteed under indivisible items.
This has led to a series of works that have either established approximation algorithms (i.e., every
player receives an approximationof her ownmaximin share) or have resolved special cases of the
problem; see our RelatedWork section. Currently, the best algorithmswe are aware of achieve an
approximation ratio of 2/3 [21, 1], and it is still a challenging open problem if one can do better.
These previousworks, apart from examining the existence ofmaximin share allocations, have
studied the problem from an algorithmic point of view, and one aspect that has not been ad-
dressed so far is incentive compatibility. Playersmay have incentives tomisreport their valuation
functions and in fact, the proposed approximation algorithms are not truthful. Is it possible then
to have truthful algorithms with the same approximation guarantee? Truthfulness is a demand-
ing constraint especially in settings without monetary transfers, and our goal is to explore the
effects on the approximability of the problem as we impose such a constraint.
Contribution. We investigate the existence of truthful deterministic mechanisms for construct-
ing approximate or exact maximin share allocations. In doing so, we consider three models re-
garding the information that the mechanism attempts to elicit from the players.
The first one is the more straightforward approach where players have to submit their entire
additive valuation function to themechanism. We thenmove tomechanismswhere themanipu-
lating power of the players is restricted by the type of information that they are allowed to submit.
Namely, in our second model players only submit their ranking over the items, motivated by the
fact that many mechanisms in the fair division literature fall within this class. Finally, in our
thirdmodel we assume themechanismdesigner knows the ranking of each player over the items
and asks for a valuation function consistentwith the ranking. This can be appropriate for settings
where the items are distinct enough to extract a ranking, or when the players are known to belong
to specific behavioral types. For each of thesemodels, we establish positive and negative (impos-
sibility) results and highlight the differences and similarities between them. Our results provide
a clear separation between the guarantees achievable by truthful and non-truthfulmechanisms.
We also note that all our positive results yield polynomial time algorithms, whereas the impossi-
bility results are independent of the running time of an algorithm. Moreover, we pay particular
attention to the case of two players, which already gives rise to non-trivial questions, even with a
small number of items.
Finally,motivatedby the lack of positive results for deterministicmechanisms, we analyze the
performance of a very simple truthful randomizedmechanism. For a wide range of distributions
for the values of the items, we show that we have an arbitrarily good approximation when the
number of the items is large enough.
RelatedWork. The notion of maximin share allocations was introduced by Budish [10] (building
on concepts of Moulin [19]), and later on defined by Bouveret and Lemaître [5] in the setting
that we study here. Both experimental and theoretical evidence, see [5, 16, 1], indicate that such
allocations do exist almost always. As for computation, a 2/3 approximation algorithm has been
established by Procaccia andWang [21] and later on, a polynomial time algorithmwith the same
guarantee was provided by Amanatidis et al. [1].
Regarding incentive compatibility, we are not aware of any prior work that addresses the de-
sign of truthfulmechanisms formaximin share allocations. There have been quite a fewworks on
mechanisms for other fairness notions, see among others [11, 12, 17]. Parts of our work are mo-
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tivated by the question of what is the power of cardinal information versus ordinal information.
We note that exploring what can be done using only ordinal information has been recently stud-
ied for other optimization problems too, (see [2]). A popular class of mechanisms based only on
ordinal preferences is the class induced by “picking sequences”, introduced by Kohler and Chan-
drasekaran [15]; see also references in Section 4. We make use of such algorithms to establish
some of our positive results.
Finally, we should note that it has been customary in the context of fair division to not allow
side payments, hence these are mechanism design problems without money. We stick to the
same approach here.
2 Preliminaries
For any k ∈N, we denote by [k] the set {1, . . . ,k}. Let N = [n] be a set of n players andM = [m] be
a set of indivisible items. We assume each player has an additive valuation function vi (·) over the
items, and we will write vi j instead of vi ({ j }). For S ⊆M , we let vi (S)=
∑
j∈S vi j . An allocation of
M to the n players is a partition, T = (T1, ...,Tn), where Ti ∩T j =; and
⋃
i Ti =M . Let Πn(M) be
the set of all partitions of a setM into n bundles.
Definition 2.1. Given n players, and a set M of items, the n-maximin share of a player i with
respect to M is:
µi (n,M)= max
T∈Πn (M)
min
T j∈T
vi (T j ) .
When it is clear from the context what n,M are, we will simply write µi instead of µi (n,M).
The solution concept defined in [10] asks for a partition that gives each player hermaximin share.
Definition 2.2. Given n players and a set of items M, a partition T = (T1, ...,Tn) ∈Πn(M) is called
a maximin share allocation if vi (Ti ) ≥ µi , for every i ∈ [n]. If vi (Ti ) ≥ ρ ·µi , ∀i ∈ [n], with ρ ≤ 1,
then T is called a ρ-approximate maximin share allocation.
It can be easily seen that this is a relaxation of the classic notion of proportionality.
Example 1. Consider an instance with 3 players and 5 items:
a b c d e
Player 1 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3
Player 2 1/2 1/4 1/4 1/4 0
Player 3 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2
IfM = {a,b,c,d ,e} is the set of items, one can see thatµ1(3,M)= 1/2,µ2(3,M)= 1/4,µ3(3,M)= 1.
For player 1, no matter how she partitions the items into three bundles, the worst bundle will be
worth at most 1/2 for her. Similarly, player 3 can guarantee a value of 1 (which is best possible as
it is equal to v3(M)/n) by the partition ({a,b}, {c}, {d ,e}). Note that this instance admits amaximin
share allocation, e.g., ({a}, {b,c}, {d ,e}), and in fact this is not unique.
Note also that if we remove some player, say player 2, the maximin values for the other two
players increase. E.g.,µ1(2,M)= 1, achieved by the partition ({a,b}, {c,d ,e}). Similarly,µ3(2,M)=
3/2.
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2.1 Mechanism design aspects
Following most of the fair division literature, our focus is on mechanism design without money,
i.e., we donot allow side payments to the players. Then, the standardway to define truthfulness is
as follows: an instance of the problem can be described as an n×m valuationmatrixV = [vi j ], as
in Example 1 above. For anymechanism A, we denote by A(V )= (A1(V ), . . . ,An(V )) the allocation
output by A on inputV . Also, let vi denote the i th row ofV , andV−i denote the remainingmatrix.
Finally, let (v′
i
,V−i ) be the matrix we get by changing the i th row of V from vi to v′i .
Definition 2.3. A mechanism A is truthful if for any instance V , any player i , and any possible
declaration v′
i
of i : vi (Ai (V ))≥ vi (Ai (v′i ,V−i )).
Obtaining a good understanding of truthful mechanisms and their performance for other
fairness notions has been a difficult problem; see among others [17, 11] for approximatingmini-
mum envy with truthful mechanisms. The difficulty is that an algorithm that uses anm-dimen-
sional vector of values for each player, can create many subtle ways for players to benefit by
misreporting. One can try to alleviate this by restricting the type of information that is requested
from the players. As a first instantiation of this, we note that many mechanisms in the litera-
ture end up utilizing only the ranking of each player for the items, and not the entire valuation
function, (see our discussion in Section 4 and references therein). This yields simpler, intuitive
mechanisms, at the expense of possibly sacrificing performance, since the mechanism uses less
information. As a second instantiation, one can exploit information that could be available to
the mechanism so as to restrict the allowed valuations. For example, in some scenarios, it is re-
alistic to assume that the ranking of each player over the items is public knowledge. If the items
are distinct enough, it is possible that one could extract such information (a special case is that
of full correlation, considered in [6, 3], where all players have the same ranking). Therefore, the
players in such cases can only submit values that agree with their (known) ranking.
Motivated by the above considerations, we study the following three models:
• The Cardinal or Standard Model. Every player submits a valuation function, without any
restrictions. To represent the input of player i , we fix an ordering of the items and write the
corresponding vector of values as vi = [vi1,vi2, . . . ,vim].
• The Ordinal Model. Here, an instance is again determined by a matrix V , however a mech-
anism only asks players to submit a ranking on the items. Note that Definition 2.3 of truth-
fulness needs to be modified accordingly. That is, let ºi be any total order consistent with vi
(there may be many in case of ties). A mechanism is truthful if for any tuple of rankings for
the other players, denoted by º−i , and any rankingº′i : vi (Ai (ºi ,º−i ))≥ vi (Ai (º′i ,º−i )).
• The Public RankingsModel. Now, the ranking of each player is known to themechanism, say
it is ºi . Hence, each player is asked to submit a valuation function consistent with ºi .
It is not hard to see how the different scenarios we investigate are related to each other; this
is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. (i) Assume there exists a truthful ρ-approximation mechanism A in the cardinal
model. Then, A can be efficiently turned into a truthful ρ-approximation mechanism for the pub-
lic rankings model.
(ii) Assume there exists a truthful ρ-approximation mechanism A for the ordinal model. Then, A
can be efficiently turned into a truthful ρ-approximation mechanism for the cardinal model.
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Proof. (i) The mechanism B for the public rankings model will take as input the values v′
i
=
[v ′
i1
, . . . ,v ′
im
],∀i ∈ [n] as reported by the players, together with the actual (publicly known) rank-
ings ºi ,∀i ∈ [n]. If for some j the reported v′j is not consistent with º j , then player j is ignored
by the mechanism. For all the consistent players B runs A on the same inputs and outputs the
same allocation as A. Clearly, no player has incentive to be inconsistent with her ranking. Given
that, the truthfulness of B follows from the truthfulness of A, as does the approximation ratio.
(ii) The mechanism B for the cardinal model will take as input the values v′
i
= [v ′
i1
, . . . ,v ′
im
],
∀i ∈ [n] as reported by the players, and will produce the corresponding rankings º′
i
,∀i ∈ [n].
Then, B runs A using as input the rankings º′
i
,∀i ∈ [n] and outputs the same allocation as A. It
is clear that no player has incentive tomisreport her values without changing her actual ranking.
Given that, the truthfulness of B follows from the truthfulness of A, as does the approximation
ratio.
3 The Cardinal Model
As already alluded to, designing mechanisms that utilize the values submitted by each player,
so as to achieve a good approximation and at the same time induce truthful behavior, is a very
challenging problem. This is true even in the case of n = 2 players. Therefore, we start first with a
rather weak result for general n andm, and thenmove on to discuss the case of two players. The
main message from this section (Theorem 3.3) is that there is a clear separation, regarding the
approximation guarantees of truthful and non-truthful algorithms.
Theorem 3.1. For any n ≥ 2,m ≥ 1, there is a truthful 1/
⌊
max{2,m−n+2}
2
⌋
-approximation mecha-
nism for the cardinal model.
The proof follows from results in the next section (see the discussion before and after Theo-
rem 4.1). For the case of two players, the mechanism of Theorem 3.1 has the following form:
MechanismMBEST ITEM: Given the reported valuations of the players, allocate to player 1 her best
item and to player 2 the remaining items.
Although the approximation ratio achieved by Theorem 3.1 is quite small, it is still an open
question whether there exist better mechanisms for general n,m. We note also that MBEST ITEM
only utilizes the preference rankings of the players. Hence it is not even clear if there exist truthful
mechanisms that can exploit more information from the valuation functions to achieve a better
approximation.
For the remainder of this section, we discuss the case of n = 2. We recall that for two play-
ers, the discretized cut and choose procedure is a non-truthful algorithm that produces an exact
maximin share allocation; one player partitions the goods into two bundles that are as equal as
possible, and the other player chooses her best bundle. To implement this in polynomial time,
we can produce an approximate partitioning using a result of Woeginger [23] and then we can
guarantee at least (1−ε)µi to each player, ∀ε> 0. The reason this is not truthful is that player 1
can manipulate the partitioning; in fact, she can compute her optimal strategy if she knows the
valuations of player 2 by solving a Knapsack instance. Thus, the questionwe would like to resolve
is to find the best truthful approximation that we can guarantee for two players.
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Notice that for n = 2,m < 4, the mechanism MBEST ITEM does output an exact maximin share
allocation. Further, whenm ∈ {4,5},MBEST ITEM outputs a 1/2-approximation, according to Theo-
rem 3.1.
On the other hand, we can deduce an impossibility result, using Theorem 5 of [18], which
yields1:
Corollary 3.2 (implied by [18]). For n = 2,m ≥ 4, and for any ε ∈ (0,1/3], there is no truthful
(2/3+ε)-approximation mechanism for the cardinal model.
The above corollary leaves open whether there exist better mechanisms thanMBEST ITEM with
approximation guarantees in (1/2,2/3]. Our main result in this section is that we close this gap,
by providing a stronger negative result, which shows thatMBEST ITEM is optimal for n = 2,m = 4.
Theorem3.3. For n = 2,m ≥ 4, and for any ε ∈ (0,1/2], there is no truthful (1/2+ε)-approximation
mechanism for the cardinal model.
We prove the theorem for m = 4, since we can trivially extend it to any number of items by
adding dummy items of no value. The proof follows from Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 below. Notice that
the theorem is valid even if we drastically restrict the possible values of the items.
Lemma 3.4. For n = 2,m = 4, and for any ε ∈ (0,1/2], there is no truthful (1/2+ε)-approximation
mechanism for the cardinal model that allocates two items to each player at every instance where
the profiles are permutations of {2+ε,1+ε,1−ε,ε/2} or {2−ε,1+ε,1−ε,ε/2}.
Proof. Let us first fix an ordering of the four items, say a,b,c,d . For the sake of readability we
write 2+,2−,1+,1−,0+ instead of 2+ε,2−ε,1+ε,1−ε and ε/2.
Suppose that there is such amechanism. We use six different profiles, the values of which are
permutations of either {2+,1+,1−,0+} or {2+,1+,1−,0+}. Notice that in such profiles the maximin
share is 2+ε/2 or 2−ε/2 respectively. Since we want allocations that give to each player items of
value at least 1/2+ε of their maximin share, it is trivial to check that allocating {1+,0+} or {1−,0+}
to a player is not feasible (we use this repeatedly below). The goal is to get a contradiction by
reaching a profile where no possible allocations exist.
Profile 1: {[2−,1+,1−,0+], [2−,1+,1−,0+]}. There are two feasible allocations, i) ({a,d}, {b,c}) and ii)
({b,c}, {a,d}). W.l.o.g. we may assume that the mechanism outputs allocation i). The analysis in
the other case is symmetric.
Profile 2: {[2−,1+,1−,0+], [0+,2+,1−,1+]}. There are three feasible allocations, i) ({a,c}, {b,d}), ii)
({a,d}, {b,c}) and iii) ({a,b}, {c,d}). Allocation iii) is not possible, since p2 here could play v
′
2 =
[2−,1+,1−,0+] like in Profile 1 and get a total value of 3 > 2. Allocations i) and ii) are currently
possible.
Profile 3: {[1+,2−,1−,0+], [0+,2+,1−,1+]}. There are two feasible allocations, i) ({a,c}, {b,d}) and ii)
({a,b}, {c,d}). If themechanism given Profile 2 outputs allocation ii), then neither allocation here
is possible. Indeed, in Profile 2 p1 could play v
′
1 = [1+,2−,1−,0+] like here and get a total value of
3−2ε> 2−ε/2 or 3> 2−ε/2. Thus, allocation ii) at Profile 2 is not possible. So, the mechanism,
given Profile 2, outputs allocation i) of that profile. Then, using the same argument, allocation ii)
here is not possible, since in Profile 2 p1 could play v
′
1 = [1+,2−,1−,0+] like here and get a total
value of 3> 3−ε. So, here, the mechanism outputs allocation i).
1The work of [18] concerns a different problem however the arguments for their impossibility result can be em-
ployed here as well.
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Profile 4: {[1+,2−,1−,0+], [1+,2+,1−,0+]}. There are two feasible allocations, i) ({a,c}, {b,d}) and
ii) ({b,d}, {a,c}). Allocation ii) is not possible, since p2 here could play v
′
2 = [0+,2+,1−,1+] like in
Profile 3 and get a total value of 2+3ε/2> 2. Thus, themechanism outputs allocation i).
Profile 5: {[1+,1−,2−,0+], [2−,1+,1−,0+]}. There are two feasible allocations, i) ({c,d}, {a,b}) and ii)
({b,c}, {a,d}). Allocation ii) is not possible, since in Profile 1 p1 could play v
′
1 = [1+,1−,2−,0+] like
here and get a total value of 2> 2−ε/2. Thus, the mechanism outputs allocation i).
Profile 6: {[1+,1−,2−,0+], [1+,2+,1−,0+]}. There are two feasible allocations, i) ({c,d}, {a,b}) and
ii) ({a,c}, {b,d}). Allocation ii) is not possible, since p2 here could play v
′
2 = [2−,1+,1−,0+] like in
Profile 5 and get a total value of 3+2ε> 2+3ε/2. However, allocation i) is not possible either, since
p1 here could play v
′
1 = [1+,2−,1−,0+] like in Profile 4 and get a total value of 3 > 2−ε/2. So, we
can conclude that there are no possible allocations for this profile, which is a contradiction.
Using Lemma 3.4, we deduce that theremust exist some instance where themechanism allo-
cates one item to one player and three items to the other. We prove below that this is not possible
either.
Lemma 3.5. For n = 2,m = 4, and for any ε ∈ (0,1/2], there is no truthful (1/2+ε)-approximation
mechanism for the cardinal model, which at some instance where the profiles are permutations of
{2+ε,1+ε,1−ε,ε/2} or {2−ε,1+ε,1−ε,ε/2}, allocates exactly one item to one of the players.
Proof. Fix an ordering of the four items, say a,b,c,d . We write 2+,2−,1+,1−,0+ instead of 2+
ε,2− ε,1+ ε,1− ε and ε/2. Suppose that there is such a truthful mechanism, and an instance
{[v1a ,v1b ,v1c ,v1d ], [v2a ,v2b ,v2c ,v2d ]} (that we refer to as the initial profile), where the mecha-
nism gives one item to p1 and three items to p2 (the symmetric case can be handled in the same
manner). Like in the proof of Lemma 3.4, it is straightforward to check that allocating {1+,0+} or
{1−,0+} to a player is not feasible.
Recall that the values of each player are a permutation of either {2+,1+,1−,0+} or {2−,1+,1−,0+}.
Since p1 gets only one item, its value must be 2
+ or 2−. W.l.o.g. we may assume that this item is
a, so the produced allocation is ({a}, {b,c,d}). We will now construct a chain of profiles (Profiles
1-4) which will help us establish a contradiction.
Profile 1: {[v1a ,v1b ,v1c ,v1d ], [2
−,v1b ,v1c ,v1d ]}. It is easy to see that p2 can not get just item a,
or item a and the item that has value 0+, or any proper subset of {b,c,d}, since she could then
play [v2a ,v2b ,v2c ,v2d ] as in the initial profile, and end up strictly better. Moreover, p2 cannot
get a bundle that contains a and (at least) one item with value 1− or 1+, because then there is
not enough value left for p1. Thus, the only feasible allocation here is ({a}, {b,c,d}). W.l.o.g., by
possibly renaming items b,c,d , we take Profile 1 to be {[v1a ,1
+,1−,0+], [2−,1+,1−,0+]}.
Profile 2: {[v1a ,1
+,1−,0+], [0+,2−,1+,1−]}. It is easy to notice that in any feasible allocation other
than ({a}, {b,c,d}), p2 could play v
′
2 = [2−,1+,1−,0+] as in Profile 1 and end upwith a better value.
Thus, the mechanism here has to output ({a}, {b,c,d}).
Profile 3: {[1−,v1a ,0+,1−], [0+,2−,1+,1−]}. Here, p1 cannot get a proper superset of {a}, since then
in Profile 1 she could play v′1 = [1−,v1a ,0+,1−] like here and end up strictly better. The only other
feasible allocation here is ({b}, {a,c,d}).
Profile 4: {[1−,v1a ,0+,1−], [2−,1+,1−,0+]}. Here, p2 cannot get {b,c} or any proper subset of {a,c,d},
since she could then play v′2 = [0+,2−,1+,1−] like in Profile 3 and end up with a total value of
3−3ε/2, which is strictly better. The only other feasible allocation here is ({b}, {a,c,d}).
By starting now at Profile 2 and repeating the arguments for Profiles 1, 2, and 3 –shifted one
position to the right– we have that for Profile 5: {[1−,v1a ,0+,1+], [1−,0+,2−,1+]} the only possi-
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ble allocation is ({b}, {a,c,d}), and for Profile 6: {[1+,1−,v1a ,0+], [1−,0+,2−,1+]} the only possible
allocation is ({c}, {a,b,d}).
Profile 7: {[1+,1−,v1a ,0+], [2−,1+,1−,0+]}. Here, p2 cannot receive {b,c} or any proper subset of
{a,c,d}, since she could then play v′2 = [1−,0+,2−,1+] as in Profile 6 and be better off. The only
other feasible allocation is ({c}, {a,b,d}).
Final profile: {[1,1,1,1], [2−,1+,1−,0+]}. Here, any feasible allocation has to give p1 at least two
items, otherwise it is not a (1/2+ ε)-approximation. However, one can check that for any such
allocation, there is a profile among Profiles 1, 4 and 7, where p1 could play v
′
1 = [1,1,1,1] and
end up strictly better. Thus, we conclude that there are no possible allocations here, arriving at a
contradiction.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
4 The Ordinal Model
Several works in the fair division literature have proposedmechanisms that only ask for the ordi-
nal preferences of the players. There are various reasons for such assumptions; apart from their
simplicity in implementing them, the players themselves may feel more at ease as they may be
reluctant to fully reveal their valuation. Here, one extra motive is to restrict the players’ ability to
manipulate the outcome.
A class of such simple and intuitive mechanisms that has been studied in previous works is
the class of picking sequencemechanisms, see, e.g., [15, 7, 9, 3, 4, 13, 14] and references therein. A
picking sequence π = pi1pi2 . . .pik is just a sequence of players (possibly with repetitions). Each
picking sequence naturally induces a deterministic allocation mechanism for the ordinal model
as follows: first give to player pi1 her favorite item, then give to pi2 her favorite among the remain-
ing items, and so on, and keep cycling through π until all the items are allocated. Sometimes,
periodicity is absent, because the length of the given sequence is at leastm.
Notice that these mechanisms can be implemented by asking each player for her ranking
over the items. And note also that these mechanisms are not generally truthful, unless they are
sequential dictatorships, i.e., they are induced by picking sequences of the form p
m1
i1
p
m2
i2
. . .p
mk
ik
,
where pi1 ,pi2 , . . . ,pik are all different players and
∑
imi ≥m (see [4]).
Given a set of n players p1, . . . ,pn , we now define the followingmechanism:
M (n,m)PICK SEQ is the mechanism induced by the picking sequence π= p1p2p3 . . .pn−2pn−1pnpn . . .pn .
Thus, given that there are enough items available, the first n−1 players receive exactly one
item, and the last player receives the remainingm−n+1 items. This is a truthful mechanism,
given the observation above. It is easy to see that ifm ≤ n+1, thenM (n,m)PICK SEQ constructs an exact
maximin share allocation. For large values of m, however, the approximation deteriorates fast
and we also have a strong impossibility result.
Theorem 4.1. The mechanism M (n,m)PICK SEQ defined above is a truthful 1/
⌊
m−n+2
2
⌋
-approximation
for the ordinal model, for any n ≥ 2,m ≥ n+2. Moreover, there is no truthful mechanism for the
ordinal model, induced by some picking sequence, that achieves a better approximation factor.
Proof. As mentioned above, the only strategyproof picking sequences are the ones of the form
s = am1
i1
a
m2
i2
. . .a
mn
in
, where {ai1 , . . .ain } = N and
∑n
j=1m j =m . For ease of notation, we may each
time rename the players, so that ai j = p j .
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Let k ∈N . If∑k−1j=1m j ≥ k, then consider the case where the values are fully correlated, and for
player pk we have vk j = 1 for 1≤ j ≤ k and vk j = 0 for k < j ≤m. Clearly, she will get a bundle of
value 0, while µk = 1. So, in order to have any guarantee with respect to the maximin share, we
must have
∑k−1
j=1m j < k and mk > 0, for all k ∈ N . Then, the only possible sequences are of the
form ai1ai2 . . .ain−1a
m−n+1
in
(like the sequence that inducesM (n,m)PICK SEQ).
To show that these picking sequences give a 1/
⌊
m−n+2
2
⌋
-approximationwe need the following
lemma of [1]:
Lemma 4.2 (Monotonicity Lemma [1]). Fix a player i and an item j . Then for any other player
k 6= i , it holds that µk(n−1,M { j })≥µk(n,M).
As above, assume s = p1p2 . . .pn−1pm−n+1n , and notice that player pn always gets items of
total value at least µn . Any other player, pk , gets one item, say of value x. Let M
′ be the set of
available items right before pk picks. Apply theMonotonicity Lemma k−1 times to getµk(n,M)≤
µk(n−k+1,M ′)≤
⌊
m−k+1
n−k+1
⌋
·max j∈M ′ vk j =
⌊
m−k+1
n−k+1
⌋
·x. Since
⌊
m−k+1
n−k+1
⌋
is maximized for k = n−1,
we get the desired approximation ratio.
Notice that Theorem 4.1 combined with Lemma 2.4(ii) imply Theorem 3.1.
Now, we return to the case of two players. For n = 2, the mechanismM (2,m)PICK SEQ is identical to
mechanismMBEST ITEM defined in Section 3. Hence, as already pointed out there, thismechanism
achieves a 1/2-approximation for m ∈ {4,5}. We can now combine the impossibility result of
Theorem 3.3 and Lemma 2.4(ii) to conclude thatM (2,m)PICK SEQ is optimal for the ordinal model when
m ∈ {4,5}.
Corollary 4.3. For n = 2,m ≥ 4, and for any ε∈ (0,1/2], there is no truthful (1/2+ε)-approximation
mechanism for the ordinal model.
For the sake of completeness, in the Appendix we include a proof of Corollary 4.3 that does
not depend on the results of Section 3.
The impossibility results of Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 4.3 have a surprising consequence.
The mechanism M (2,m)PICK SEQ achieves the best possible approximation both for the cardinal and
the ordinal model, for m ∈ {4,5}. Therefore, in these cases, giving the mechanism designer ac-
cess to more information does not improve the approximation factor at all, when truthfulness is
required!
We conclude this sectionwith a general result on the limitationsof the ordinalmodel. Judging
from the case n = 2, it seems that the lack of good approximation guarantees in the cardinal
model is due to the truthfulness requirement. Here, however, an additional issue is the lack of
information itself. Below, we prove an inapproximability result for anymechanism in the ordinal
model, independent of whether it is truthful or not.
Theorem 4.4. For n ≥ 2, and for any ε> 0, there is no (1/Hn +ε)-approximation algorithm, be it
truthful or not, for the ordinal model, where Hn is the n
th harmonic number, with Hn = Θ(lnn).
Moreover, for n = 3, there is no (1/2+ε)-approximation algorithm for the ordinal model.
Proof. Let A be an α-approximation algorithm for the ordinal model, where α > 0. Consider an
instance with large enough m, where all the players agree on the ranking 1 º 2 º . . . ºm. Let
gi be the best item that player i receives by A. We renumber the players, if needed, so that if
i < j then gi < g j . We claim that gi = i . To see that, consider player n. Clearly, by the definition
of gn and the renumbering of the players, we have gn ≥ n. If gn > n, let vn1 = . . . = vnn = 1 and
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vn,n+1 = . . .= vnm = 0. Then, in such an instance, algorithm A will fail to give anα-approximation
of µn to player n. It follows that gn = n, and therefore 1= g1 < g2 < . . .< gn−1 < n, which implies
gi = i for every i ∈ [n].
Now, for i ≥ 1, suppose that vi1 = . . . = vi ,i−1 = 1 and vi i = . . . = vim = 1m−i+1 . Observe that
µi =
⌊
m−i+1
n−i+1
⌋
1
m−i+1 , and algorithm A must give at least
⌈
α
⌊
m−i+1
n−i+1
⌋⌉
items to player i .
Since there are m items in total, we must have
∑n
i=1
⌈
α
⌊
m−i+1
n−i+1
⌋⌉
≤m. It follows that for any
ε> 0 and large enoughm
α≤ m∑n
i=1
⌊
m−i+1
n−i+1
⌋ ≤ m∑n
i=1
(
m−i+1
n−i+1 −1
) = 1(
1− n
m
)∑n
i=1
1
n−i+1
< 1
Hn
+ε .
Especially for n = 3, assume thatα> 1/2 and consider the same analysis as above withm = 6. We
get the contradiction
6≥∑3i=1 ⌈α⌊7−i4−i ⌋⌉= ⌈α⌊63⌋⌉+⌈α⌊52⌋⌉+⌈α⌊41⌋⌉≥ 2+2+3= 7.
5 The Public Rankings Model
When the players’ rankings are publicly known, one would expect to achieve better approxima-
tion ratios, while still maintaining truthfulness. Indeed, the mechanism now has more informa-
tion, while the options for manipulation are greatly reduced. In particular, note that any picking
sequence induces a truthfulmechanism for the public rankingsmodel.
We show that indeed this is the case; the impossibility results we obtain are less severe and
we have improvements for the case of more than two players as well.
We focus first on two players. For m < 4, the mechanism M (2,m)PICK SEQ from Section 4 gives an
exact solution, like before. However, unlike what happens in the other two scenarios, form = 4
wenowhave a truthful exactmechanism. Beforewedescribe themechanism,we introduce some
useful notation. For a player i , we will denote by Bi (k1,k2, . . .kℓ) the set of items that are in the
positions k1,k2, . . .kℓ, of her ranking. E.g., B2(2,4) denotes the bundle that contains the second
and the fourth items in the ranking of player 2.
Mechanism M (2,4)PR-EXACT: Given the reported valuations of the two players p1,p2, and their actual
rankings, consider two cases:
— If their most valuable items are different, allocate the items according to the picking sequence
p1p2p2p1.
— Otherwise, give to player 1 her most valuable bundle among B1(1) and B1(2,3), and to player 2
the remaining items.
Theorem 5.1. Mechanism M (2,4)PR-EXACT is truthful and produces an exact maximin share allocation
for the public rankings model, for n = 2,m = 4.
Proof. To see whyM (2,4)PR-EXACT is truthful, note that the players cannot affect which of the two cases
of M (2,4)PR-EXACT will be employed, since this is defined by the publicly known rankings. In addition,
only p1 could strategize, in the case where she agrees with p2 on the most valuable item. How-
ever, in that caseM (2,4)PR-EXACT gives her the best bundle between two choices defined by her ranking,
thus there is no incentive to lie about her true values.
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To prove now the guarantee for the maximin share, observe that when the two players dis-
agree on their most valuable item, p1 receives one of B1(1,2), B1(1,3), or B1(1,4), and p2 receives
either B2(1,2), or B2(1,3). Similarly, when they agree on their most valuable item, p1 receives her
best bundle among B1(1) and B1(2,3), and p2 receives either a bundle of three items, or one of
B2(1,2), B2(1,3), or B2(1,4).
Consider the seven possible ways pi can split the four items into non-empty bundles: (Bi (1),
Bi (2,3,4)), (Bi (2),Bi (1,3,4)), (Bi (3),Bi (1,2,4)), (Bi (4),Bi (1,2,3)), (Bi (1,2),Bi (3,4)), (Bi (1,3),Bi (2,4))
and (Bi (1,4),Bi (2,3)). From the definition ofmaximin share, in at least one of those, both bundles
have value at least µi .
It is easy to see that the total value ofBi (1,3) (and thus ofBi (1,2)), is always at leastµi , and the
same holds for any bundle that contains three items. Moreover, we claim that both vi (Bi (1,4))
and max{vi (Bi (1)),vi (Bi (2,3))} are at least µi , which suffice to prove the theorem. Indeed, if
vi (Bi (1,4)) < µi or max{vi (Bi (1)),vi (Bi (2,3))} < µi , this implies that each one of Bi (1), Bi (2),
Bi (3), Bi (4), Bi (2,3), Bi (2,4), and Bi (3,4) also has value less than µi . Thus, none of the possible
partitions has both bundles worth at least µi , contradicting the definition of maximin share.
An interesting question is whether the above can be extended for any number of items. We
exhibit below that the answer is no, hence non-truthful algorithms have a strictly better per-
formance under this model as well. However, for general m we provide later on an improved
approximation in comparison to the other two settings.
Theorem 5.2. For n = 2, and m = 5, there is no truthful (5/6+ε)-approximation mechanism for
any ε ∈ (0,1/6], while for m ≥ 6, there is no truthful (4/5+ε)-approximation mechanism for any
ε ∈ (0,1/5].
Proof. We give the proof form = 6, which can be extended tom ≥ 6, by adding dummy items of
no value. The proof form = 5 is of similar flavor, albeit more complicated, and is included in the
Appendix.
Suppose that there exists a deterministic truthful mechanism for the public rankings model
that achieves a (4/5+ε)-approximation for some ε> 0. We study five profiles where the ranking
of the six items is a ºi b ºi c ºi d ºi e ºi f for i ∈ {1,2}, thus it is feasible for both players tomove
between these profiles in order to increase the value they get. Recall that in our current model
a player can strategize using the values of the items, but without changing their publicly known
ranking.
Profile 1: {[1,1,1,1,1,1], [1,1,1,1,1,1]}. Here, µi = 3 for i ∈ {1,2}, so in order to achieve a better
than a 0.8-approximation, the mechanism must give to each player items of value greater than
0.8 ·µi = 2.4. Thus each player has to receive three items. W.l.o.g. we may assume that p1 gets
item a (the analysis in the other case is symmetric).
Profile 2: {[1,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2], [1,1,1,1,1,1]}. Here, µ1 = 1 and µ2 = 3. The mechanism must
give to p1 a total value greater than 0.8 ·1 = 0.8 and to p2 a total value greater than 0.8 ·3 = 2.4.
Notice now that p2 has to get at least three items, and therefore p1 has to get a superset of {a}.
In fact, p1 gets a superset of {a} of size three, otherwise she could play v
′
1 = [1,1,1,1,1,1] like in
Profile 1 and end up strictly better. So, we conclude that both players get three items each, and
p1 gets item a.
Profile 3: {[1,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2], [1,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2]}. Here, µi = 1 for i ∈ {1,2}, so in order to
achieve something strictly greater than 0.8 · 1 = 0.8, there are only two feasible allocations: i)
({b,c,d ,e, f }, {a}), and ii) ({a}, {b,c,d ,e, f }). Now, notice that allocation ii) is not possible, since
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then at Profile 2 p2 could play v
′
2 = [1,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2] like here and end up strictly better.
Thus, the mechanism outputs ({b,c,d ,e, f }, {a}).
Profile 4: {[1,1,1,1,1,1], [1,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2]}. Here, µ1 = 3 and µ2 = 1. The mechanism must
give to p1 a total value greater than 0.8 ·3 = 2.4 and to p2 a total value greater than 0.8 ·1 = 0.8.
Notice now that p1 has to get five items, since otherwise she could play v
′
1 = [1,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2]
like in Profile 2 and end up strictly better. Thus p2 has to get {a} to achieve the desired ratio.
Profile 5: {[1,1,1,1,1,1], [0.7,0.3,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25]}. Here, µ1 = 3 and µ2 = 1. The mechanism
must give to p1 a total value greater than 0.8·3= 2.4 and to p2 a total value greater than 0.8·1= 0.8.
First, notice that p1 must get at least three items. Moreover, if the mechanism does not give item
a to p2, then there is no way for p2 to get total value strictly greater than 0.8 with at most three
items. Therefore, p2 has to get a strict superset of {a}. However, this is not feasible either, since in
Profile 4 p2 could play v
′
2 = [0.7,0.3,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25] like here and end up strictly better. Thus,
we conclude that there are no possible allocations here, arriving at a contradiction.
Exploiting the fact that picking sequences induce truthful mechanisms for the public rank-
ings model, we can get more positive results for two players and anym.
M (2,m)PR is the mechanism for two players induced by the picking sequence p1p2p2.
We have the following result forM (2,m)PR .
Theorem 5.3. For n = 2 and any m ≥ 1, M (2,m)PR is a truthful 2/3-approximation mechanism for
the public rankings model.
Hence, for n = 2, we have a pretty clear picture on what we can achieve for any m, leaving
only a small gap, i.e., [2/3,4/5], between the impossibility result and Theorem 5.3.
We can also obtain constant factor approximations formore than twoplayers,which has been
elusive in the other twomodels. E.g., forn = 3, we can achieve a 1/2-approximation. In particular,
for any n ≥ 2, andm ≥ 1:
M (n,m)PR is the mechanism induced by the picking sequence p1p2p3 . . .pn−1pnpn .
Theorem5.4. For any n ≥ 2, and anym ≥ 1, themechanismM (n,m)PR is a truthful 2n+1 -approximation
mechanism for the public rankings model.
Proof. Let M be the initial set of items, and consider player pi , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1, right before
she picks her first item. We can think of pi as the first player of the picking sequence pipi+1 . . .
pn−1pnpnp1p2 . . .pi−1 on a new set of items M ′ ⊆M , in which i − 1 items have been removed.
Now, since pi picks her best item out of every n+1 items, it is easy to see that the total value she
gets is at least∑
j∈M ′ vi j
n+1 ≥
(n− i +1)µi (n− i +1,M ′)
n+1 ≥
(n− i +1)µi (n,M)
n+1 ≥
2µi (n,M)
n+1 ,
where the first inequality follows directly from the definition of the maximin share, and the sec-
ond inequality follows from Lemma 4.2 (applied i −1 times).
In a similar manner, we have that the total value pn gets is at least
2(n−n+1)µn(n,M)
n+1 =
2µn(n,M)
n+1
which concludes the proof.
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Notice that Theorem 5.3 is a corollary of Theorem 5.4. Also, observe that 2
n+1 is better than
the guarantee of Theorem 4.1. However, one can do significantly better, even when restricted to
mechanisms induced by picking sequences as shown in Theorem 5.5 below. We shouldmention
though, that the picking sequence constructed in the proof has length m; an interesting ques-
tion is whether there exist short picking sequences that significantly improve 2
n+1 . Of course, it
remains an open problem to design truthful mechanisms achieving better –or even no– depen-
dence on n.
Theorem 5.5. For ε > 0 and large enough n and m, there exists a truthful 1
n0.5+ε -approximation
mechanism for the public rankings model.
Proof. Let α = 1
n0.5+ε . Below, we show that there exists a picking sequence mechanism that α-
approximatesmaximin share allocations. This directly implies the statement of the theorem.
Focus on player pi . Assume we had a picking sequence that gives the i th pick to pi (call
this the 0th pick of pi ) and then keeps giving her her j th pick on, or before, the
(
i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋)
th
overall pick. We claim that thisway pi would get a bundle Si with vi (Si )≥αµi . To see that, notice
that when pi starts picking, in the worst case her i −1 best items are already gone and the total
remaining value is at least
∑
j vi j − (i −1)µi ≥ (n− i +1)µi . Then, because of the distribution of
her picks, pi is going to get at least 1/
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋
of this value, i.e., at least
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋−1
(n− i +1)µi ≥
α
n−i+1 (n− i +1)µi =αµi .
Next, we describe how to construct a picking sequence that satisfies the above property for
all players. Notice that we are going to give a single picking sequence of lengthm. Themain idea
is that, if pi is going to be satisfied, we want her j th pick to be no later than the
(
i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋)
th
overall pick. So, we make sure there is not too large demand from other players for picks that
come before the
(
i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋)
th. The construction itself is very simple:
– For 1≤ i ≤ n and 0≤ j ≤
⌊
α(m−i )
n−i+1
⌋
, we create the pair
(
pi , i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋)
.
– We sort the pairs with respect to their second coordinate.
– The first coordinates with respect to the above sorting are a prefix of the picking sequence.
– If the length of the above sequence is m, we are done; otherwise we arbitrarily assign the
remaining picks.
There are two things to be proven here. The first is to show that the third step of the construction
does not give a picking sequence of length greater thanm. This is not hard to see, given that n,m
are large enough. There are at most
⌊
α(m−i )
n−i+1
⌋
+1 pairs for each i , so by summing up we have:
n∑
i=1
(⌊
α(m− i )
n− i +1
⌋
+1
)
≤ n+
n∑
i=1
α(m− i )
n− i +1 ≤ n+αm
n∑
i=1
1
n− i +1 −α
n∑
i=1
i
n− i +1
≤ n+αHnm ≤m .
(Notice that n and m need not be very large for the last inequality to hold. E.g., for ε = 0.15, it
suffices to have n ≥ 5,m ≥ n
1−αHn .)
The second goal here is to show that the resulting picking sequence has the desired property,
i.e., for any i , j there are at most i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋
pairs that come no later than
(
pi , i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋)
in
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the sorting of the second step. For fixed i ,ℓ and j = 0 we have
ℓ+k
⌊
n−ℓ+1
α
⌋
≤ i ⇒
{
k = 0, if ℓ≤ i
contradiction, if ℓ> i ,
and therefore there are exactly i pairs that come no later than
(
pi , i
)
in the sorting. To see the
contradiction, notice that for k ≥ 1 we have
ℓ+k
⌊
n−ℓ+1
α
⌋
≤ i ⇒ ℓ+ n−ℓ+1
α
−1≤ n ⇒ α≥ 1.
Now, for fixed i ,ℓ and j ≥ 1 we have
ℓ+k
⌊
n−ℓ+1
α
⌋
≤ i + j
⌊
n− i +1
α
⌋
⇒ k ≤
ÌÌÌÊ i −ℓ+ j ⌊n−i+1α ⌋⌊
n−ℓ+1
α
⌋
ÍÍÍË ,
where k can be as small as 0. Therefore, we need to show that
n+
n∑
ℓ=1
ÌÌÌÊ i −ℓ+ j ⌊n−i+1α ⌋⌊
n−ℓ+1
α
⌋
ÍÍÍË≤ i + j ⌊n− i +1
α
⌋
. (1)
Before we prove (1), we should note that i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋
> n+ 1
α
−1 when j ≥ 1. Indeed,
i + j
⌊
n− i +1
α
⌋
≥ i +
⌊
n− i +1
α
⌋
≥ i + n− i +1
α
−1> i +n− i + 1
α
−1= n+ 1
α
−1.
Hence, we have
n+
n∑
ℓ=1
ÌÌÌÊ i −ℓ+ j ⌊n−i+1α ⌋⌊
n−ℓ+1
α
⌋
ÍÍÍË≤ n+ n∑
ℓ=1
i −ℓ+ j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋
⌊
n−ℓ+1
α
⌋
= n+
(
i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋) n∑
ℓ=1
1⌊
n−ℓ+1
α
⌋ − n∑
ℓ=1
ℓ⌊
n−ℓ+1
α
⌋
≤ n+
(
i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋) n∑
ℓ=1
1
n−ℓ+1
α
−1
−
n∑
ℓ=1
ℓ
n−ℓ+1
α
≤ n+
(
i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋)
α
1−αHn −α
∫n
0
x
n−x+1dx
≤ n+
(
i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋)(
1− 1−α−αHn
1−α
)
−α ((n+1) ln(n+1)−n)
≤
(
i + j
⌊
n−i+1
α
⌋)
+n− 1−α−αHn
1−α
(
n+ 1
α
−1
)
−α ((n+1) ln(n+1)−n)
At this point, it suffices to show that
n− 1−α−αHn
1−α
(
n+ 1
α
−1
)
−α ((n+1) ln(n+1)−n)≤ 0.
Using α= 1
n0.5+ε , the above is equivalent to
n−
(
1− Hn
n0.5+ε−1
)(
n+n0.5+ε−1
)
− (n+1) ln(n+1)
n0.5+ε
+n0.5−ε ≤ 0
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⇐⇒ n−n−n0.5+ε+1+ nHn
n0.5+ε−1 +Hn−
(n+1) ln(n+1)
n0.5+ε
+n0.5−ε ≤ 0
⇐⇒−n0.5+ε+Hn+n0.5−ε+1+
nHn
n0.5+ε−1 −
(n+1) ln(n+1)
n0.5+ε
≤ 0.
To see that the latter is clearly true for large n, notice that
nHn
n0.5+ε−1 −
(n+1) ln(n+1)
n0.5+ε
= n
1.5+ε(Hn − ln(n+1))+
(
n+1−n0.5+ε
)
ln(n+1)
n0.5+ε(n0.5+ε+1)
≤ n
1.5+ε+n ln(n+1)
n0.5+ε(n0.5+ε+1) =Θ
(
n0.5−ε
)
,
where we used the known fact that ln(n+1)≤ Hn ≤ ln(n+1)+1. This proves (1), and completes
the proof. (Again, it is not necessary that n is very large for things to work. E.g., for ε = 0.25, it
suffices to have n ≥ 17.)
6 A Simple RandomizedMechanism
Despite the negative results in the previous sections, there are (asymptotically) good guarantees
when the values are random and the mechanism is randomized as well. In fact, we consider the
very simple mechanism that independently allocates each item uniformly at random. The ap-
proximation guarantee for maximin share follows from the corresponding proportionality guar-
antee in Theorem 6.1 below. The theorem works for a wide range of distributions, including the
–discrete or continuous– uniform distribution on subsets of [0,1].
TheDi (n,m)s, here, are distributionsover [0,1] with the following property: there exists some
ε > 0 such that for any n,m ∈ N and any i ∈ [n] the mean of Di (n,m) is at least ε. The simplest
–although quite realistic– case is when eachDi does not depend on n andm at all, but in general
this need not be the case, as long as that their means do not vanish as n andm grow large. Also,
notice that independence is only assumed between the values of different items, and therefore
the valuation functions of different players can be correlated.
We should mention that the objective here is different from the objective in the probabilistic
analyses of [1] and [16]. We do not hope to produce an allocation that gives to each player i
value at least µi with high probability; each player should only get a fraction of that, subject to
truthfulness. This is why we are able to cover such a wide range of distributions, using such a
naive mechanism.
Theorem 6.1. Let N = [n] be a set of players and M = [m] be a set of items, and for each i ∈ [n]
assume that the vi j s are i.i.d. random variables that follow Di (n,m), where the Di (n,m)s are as
described above. Then, for any ρ ∈ [0,1) and for large enough m, there is a truthful randomized
mechanism that allocates to each player i a set of items of total value at least
ρ
n
vi (M)≥ ρ ·µi with
probability 1−O
(
n2/m
)
.
Proof. In what follows we consider the mechanism that independently allocates each item uni-
formly at random among the players. Truthfulness follows from the fact that the mechanism
completely ignores any input given by the players.
For any i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] let Xi j be the indicator r.v. for the event “player pi gets item j”, and
Yi be the total value pi receives. We have Yi =
∑
j Xi j vi j . Next, we calculate E[Yi ] and Var(Yi ).
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Clearly, E[Xi j ] = 1n and Var(Xi j ) = 1n − 1n2 =
n−1
n2
. If by µi and σ
2
i
we denote the mean and the
variance ofDi (n,m) respectively
2, then
E[Yi ]=
∑
j
E[Xi j vi j ]=
∑
j
1
n
µi =
mµi
n
,
and
Var(Yi )=
m∑
j=1
Var(Xi j vi j )=
m∑
j=1
(
Var(Xi j ) ·Var(vi j )+E2[Xi j ] ·Var(vi j )+Var(Xi j ) ·E2[vi j ]
)
=
m∑
j=1
(
σ2
i
(n−1)
n2
+
σ2
i
n2
+
(n−1)µ2
i
n2
)
=
m
(
nσ2
i
+ (n−1)µ2
i
)
n2
,
by using the independence of Xi j and vi j for any i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], as well as the independence of
Xi j1vi j1 and Xi j2vi j2 for any i ∈ [n], j1, j2 ∈ [m]. Notice that σ2i ≤ 1−µ2i and therefore
Var(Yi )≤
m
(
n(1−µ2
i
)+ (n−1)µ2
i
)
n2
=
m
(
n−µ2
i
)
n2
≤ m
n
.
Now, by setting ai = ρmµi+ρm
0.75
n
, we have
P
(
∃i such that Yi <
ρ
n
vi (M)
)
≤
n∑
i=1
P
(
Yi <
ρ ·vi (M)
n
)
=
n∑
i=1
P
(
Yi <min
{ρ ·vi (M)
n
,ai
}
or
ρ ·vi (M)
n
>max{Yi ,ai }
)
≤
n∑
i=1
P
(
Yi <min
{ρ ·vi (M)
n
,ai
})
+
n∑
i=1
P
(
ρ ·vi (M)
n
>max{Yi ,ai }
)
≤
n∑
i=1
P(Yi < ai )+
n∑
i=1
P
(
ρ ·vi (M)
n
> ai
)
.
To upper bound the first sum, we use Chebyshev’s inequality:
P(Yi < ai )= P(E[Yi ]−Yi ≥ E[Yi ]−ai )≤ P
(
|E[Yi ]−Yi | ≥
mµi
n
− ρmµi +ρm
0.75
n
)
= P
(
|E[Yi ]−Yi | ≥
(1−ρ)mµi −ρm0.75
n ·σYi
σYi
)
≤
n2σ2
Yi(
(1−ρ)mµi −ρm0.75
)2
≤
n2m
n
m2
(
(1−ρ)µi − ρm0.25
)2 = n
m
(
(1−ρ)µi − ρm0.25
)2 =O
( n
m
)
,
and thus
n∑
i=1
P(Yi < ai )=O
(
n2
m
)
.
On the other hand, using Hoeffding’s inequality,
P
(
ρ ·vi (M)
n
> ai
)
= P
(
vn(M)
m
−µi >
n ·ai
ρ ·m −µi
)
= P
(
vn(M)
m
−µi >
ρmµi +ρm0.75−ρmµi
ρ ·m
)
2Of course, µi and σ
2
i
are functions of n andm, but for simplicity we drop their arguments.
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≤ e−2m
(
1
m0.25
)2
≤ e−2
p
m = o
(
1
m
)
,
and thus
n∑
i=1
P
(
ρ ·vi (M)
n
> ai
)
= o
( n
m
)
.
Finally, we have
P
(
∀i , Yi ≥
ρ ·vi (M)
n
)
≥ 1−
n∑
i=1
P(Yi < ai )−
n∑
i=1
P
(
ρ ·vi (M)
n
> ai
)
= 1−O
(
n2
m
)
.
7 Conclusions
We embarked on the existence of truthful mechanisms for approximate maximin share alloca-
tions. In doing so, we considered three models regarding the information that a mechanism
elicits from the players, and studied their power and limitations. Quite surprisingly, we have
exhibited cases with two players where the best possible truthful approximation is achieved by
using only ordinal information.
Our work leaves several interesting questions for future research. A great open problem is
whether there exist better truthful mechanisms in the cardinal model that explicitly take into
account the players’ valuation functions rather than just ordinal information. Understanding
the power of ordinal information is an important direction in our view, which is along the same
lines as the work of [2] for other optimization problems. The fact that for n = 2 andm ∈ {4,5}, the
ordinal and the cardinal model are equivalent was rather surprising to us and it remains open to
explore how far this equivalence can go. Another more general question is to tighten the upper
and lower bounds obtained here; especially for a large number of players, these bounds are quite
loose.
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A Missing Proofs from Sections 4 and 5
Alternative Proof of Corollary 4.3. It suffices to prove the statement when we only have 4 items
a,b,c,d . Notice that since the mechanism takes as input the players’ rankings, to achieve a
(1/2+ε)-approximation for ε ∈ (0,1/2], there are some allocations that are not feasible. Specif-
ically, the mechanism cannot allocate only one item to one player and three items to the other
since there is the possibility that the first player values the items equally. Moreover, the mecha-
nism cannot give to pi the bundles Bi (2,4) or Bi (3,4). To see this, let vi = [2,1,1,0]; both Bi (2,4)
and Bi (3,4) have a total value of 1 while µi = 2. Thus, the only feasible bundles that ensure a
(1/2+ε)-approximation for a player in the ordinalmodel, areBi (1,2), Bi (1,3),Bi (1,4) andBi (2,3).
Now suppose that there exists a deterministic truthful mechanism that achieves the desired ap-
proximation ratio and consider the following profiles:
Profile 1: {[a º1 b º1 c º1 d ], [a º2 b º2 c º2 d ]}. There are two feasible allocations, i) ({a,d}, {b,c})
and ii) ({b,c}, {a,d}). W.l.o.g. wemay assume that themechanism outputs allocation i). The anal-
ysis in the other case is symmetric.
Profile 2: {[a º1 b º1 c º1 d ], [a º2 b º2 d º2 c]}. There are two feasible allocations i) ({a,c}, {b,d})
and ii) ({b,c}, {a,d}). Allocation ii) is not possible, since in Profile 1 p2 could play [a º2 b º2 d º2 c]
and get items {a,d} which –depending on p2’s valuation function– can have strictly more value
than {b,c}. Thus, the mechanism outputs allocation i).
Profile 3: {[a º1 b º1 c º1 d ], [b º2 d º2 c º2 a]}. There are three feasible allocations, i) ({a,c}, {b,d}),
ii) ({a,b}, {c,d}) and iii) ({a,d}, {b,c}). Allocations ii) and iii) are not possible, since in Profile 3 p2
could play [a º2 b º2 d º2 c] and get items {b,d} whichmight havemore value than {c,d} or {b,c}.
Thus, the mechanism outputs allocation i).
Profile 4: {[b º1 a º1 c º1 d ], [b º2 d º2 c º2 a]}. There are two feasible allocations i) ({a,c}, {b,d})
and ii) ({a,b}, {c,d}). Allocation ii) is not possible, since in Profile 3 p1 could play [b º1 a º1 c º1 d ]
and get items {a,b} which might have more value than {a,c}. Thus, themechanism outputs allo-
cation i).
Profile 5: {[b º1 a º1 c º1 d ], [b º2 a º2 c º2 d ]}. There are two feasible allocations i) ({a,c}, {b,d})
and ii) ({b,d}, {a,c}). Allocation ii) is not possible, since in Profile 5 p2 could play [b º2 d º2 c º2 a]
and get items {b,d} which might have more value than {a,c}. Thus, themechanism outputs allo-
cation i).
Profile 6: {[b º1 a º1 c º1 d ], [a º2 b º2 c º2 d ]}. There are two feasible allocations i) ({b,c}, {a,d})
and ii) ({b,d}, {a,c}). Allocation ii) is not possible, since in Profile 5 p2 could play [a º2 b º2 c º2 d ]
and get items {a,c} which might have more value than {b,d}. Allocation i) is not possible either,
since in Profile 1 p1 could play [b º1 a º1 c º1 d ] and get items {b,c} whichmight havemore value
than {a,d}. Thus, there is no possible allocation in this profile, which is a contradiction.
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Proof of Theorem 5.2 for m = 5. We shall study two cases, of five profiles each. In both cases and
for all profiles, the ordering of the items is a ºi b ºi c ºi d ºi e for both players. Suppose that
there exists a deterministic truthfulmechanism that achieves a (5/6+ε)-approximation for some
ε ∈ (0,1/5].
Profile 1: {[1,1,1,1,1], [1,1,1,1,1]}. Here, µi = 2 for i ∈ {1,2}. The mechanism must give to each
player items of value greater than 5/6·2= 1.67. Thus each player has to receive at least two items.
W.l.o.g. we may assume that p1 gets three items and p2 gets two items (the analysis in the other
case is symmetric). There are two cases to be considered depending on who gets item a:
Case 1: p1 gets item a in Profile 1.
Profile 2: {[1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25], [1,1,1,1,1]}. Here µ1 = 1 andµ2 = 2. Themechanismmust give
to p1 a total value greater than 5/6 ·1 = 0.83 and to p2 a total value greater than 5/6 ·2 = 1.67.
Notice now that p2 has to get at least two items, thus p1 has to get item a. In addition, p1 gets
three items, or she could play v′1 = [1,1,1,1,1] and end up strictly better. So, we conclude that in
this profile p1 gets three items, with a among them, while p2 gets two items.
Profile 3: {[1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25], [1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25]}. Here µi = 1 for i ∈ {1,2}, so in order to
achieve something greater than 5/6 ·1= 0.83, there are only two feasible allocations: i) p2 gets a
and p1 gets the remaining items and ii) p1 gets a and p2 gets the remaining items. Notice that
allocation ii) is not possible, since p2 in Profile 2 could play v
′
2 = [1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25] and be
better off. So, here the mechanism outputs allocation i).
Profile 4: {[1,1,1,1,1], [1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25]}. Here µ1 = 2 and µ2 = 1. The mechanism must
give to p1 a total value greater than 5/6 · 2 = 1.67 and to p2 a total value greater than 5/6 · 1 =
0.83. Notice now that p1 must get four items, or otherwise in Profile 4 she could play v
′
1 =
[1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25] and end up strictly better. Thus p2 can get only one item and thismust be
a, since it is the only item that achieves the desired ratio.
Profile 5: {[1,1,1,1,1], [0.55,0.45,0.34,0.34,0.34]}. Here µ1 = 2 and µ2 = 1. The mechanism must
give to p1 a total value greater than 5/6 ·2= 1.67 and to p2 a total value greater than 5/6 ·1= 0.83.
First notice that p1 must get at least two items. Given that, let us now examine the feasible bun-
dles for p2: i) {a,b}, ii) {a,c}, iii) item a and two more items, iv) item b and two more items,
excluding item a, and v) {c,d ,e}. Bundles i), ii), iii) are not possible, since p2 in Profile 4 could
play v′2 = [0.55,0.45,0.34,0.34,0.34] and end up strictly better. Allocations iv), v) are not possible
either, since p2 in Profile 1 could again play v
′
2 = [0.55,0.45,0.34,0.34,0.34] and end up strictly
better. Thus, we can conclude that there is no possible allocation in this profile, which leads to a
contradiction.
Case 2: p2 gets item a in Profile 1.
Profile 2: {[1,1,1,1,1], [1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25]}. Here µ1 = 2 andµ2 = 1. Themechanismmust give
to p1 a total value greater than 5/6 ·1 = 0.83 and to p2 a total value greater than 5/6 ·2 = 1.67.
Notice now that p2 must get two items, including item a. Indeed, if she gets three items, then
in Profile 1 she could play v′2 = [1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25] and end up better off. If she gets one item
(item a), then in Profile 2 she could play v′′2 = [1,1,1,1,1] and end up strictly better. So, we con-
clude that here p1 gets three items and p2 gets two items, with a among them.
Profile 3: {[1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25], [1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25]}. Here µi = 1 for i ∈ {1,2}, so in order to
achieve something higher than 5/6·1= 0.83, there are only two feasible allocations: i) p2 gets item
a and p1 gets the remaining items, and ii) p1 gets item a and p2 gets the remaining items. Notice
that allocation i) is not possible, since p1 in Profile 2 could play v
′
1 = [1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25] and
end up strictly better. So, the mechanism outputs allocation ii).
Profile 4: {[1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25], [0.5,0.5,0.35,0.33,0.32]}. Here µi = 1 for i ∈ {1,2}, so the mech-
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anismmust give to both players bundles of value greater than 5/6 ·1= 0.83. Notice that p2 must
get at least two items and thus, p1 must get item a to achieve the desired ratio. However, if p2
gets less than four items, then in Profile 4 she could play v′2 = [1,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25] and end up
strictly better. Thus, we can conclude that p1 gets item a and p2 gets the remaining items.
Profile 5: {[0.5,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.1], [0.5,0.5,0.35,0.33,0.32]}. Here µ1 = 0.6 and µ2 = 1. The mech-
anism must give to p1 a total value greater than 5/6 · 0.6 = 0.5 and to p2 a total value greater
than 5/6 · 1 = 0.83. First notice that in order to achieve the desired ratio p1 must get at least
two items. However, she can not get a proper superset of {a}, since in Profile 4 she could play
v′1 = [0.5,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.1] and end up strictly better. The only remaining feasible bundles for p1
are: i) {b,c,d} and ii) {b,c,d ,e}. It is easy to see that none of these are possible, since for the al-
location implied by i) p2 gets a total value of 0.82, and for the allocation implied by ii) p2 gets a
total value of 0.5. Thus, there is no possible allocation in this profile, which leads to a contradic-
tion.
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